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There is perhaps no issue of greater concern to national 
security policymakers than the matter of arms acquisitions 
Secure and reliable sources of weaponry are a vital component of 
a country’s defense posture Yet many third world countries must 
cope with threats to their national security in the face of 
insecure and often unreliable sources of arms Even though 
the most dependable and invulnerable sources of arms are those 
that are found within one’s own country, the vast majority of 
developing countries must still import the bulk, if not all, of 
their military hardware. A total of only 51 out of some 120 
developing countries produce conventional weapons of some 
kind Thirty-four of those 51 produce at least one of the four 
major types of conventional weapon systems aircraft, armored 
vehicles, missiles, or naval vessels Production in the other 17 
countries is limited to small arms and ammunition. Only seven 
third world countries —  Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, 
South Africa, and Taiwan —  have developed an across—the—board 
production capability  ^ Even those developing countries that 
have initiated defense manufacturing programs must still rely on 
arms imports to acquire needed military equipment.
In this chapter I will examine various forms of the arms 
acquisitions options available to third world countries and the 
impact of alternative acquisition strategies on national secur­
ity Of special concern is the relationship between specific 
arms acquisition strategies and a country’s political and 
military autonomy The maintenance of policy and behavioral
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autonomy —  the minimization of external constraints on policy 
and behavior —  is at the heart of national security. Yet policy 
and behavioral autonomy may be severely circumscribed if the 
optimal mix of acquisition strategies is not adopted.
ARMS ACQUISITION OPTIONS
For both developed and developing countries, there are 
three analytically distinct options two pure options and one 
mixed option A country may seek to rely solely on either (1) 
producing arms domestically or (2) importing arms from abroad. 
Or (3) it may choose to manufacture some weapons locally and to 
import others Even though there are only three distinct 
options, however, there are numerous forms of each of the 
different options. The discussion here, following the third 
world's experience, will proceed temporally, beginning with the 
arms import option and then continuing with a consideration of 
local production and the mixed strategy
The Arms Import Option
Given the historical context of military relations between 
the advanced industrial countries of the Northern core and the 
developing countries of the Southern periphery, it should come as 
no surprise that developing countries initially had little choice 
but to acquire arms through the arms import "option " Prior to 
having acquired formal political independence, local military 
establishments of the then colonies were fully integrated into
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the command structures of the colonial powers. Indigenous 
military forces were commanded, trained, equipped, and financed 
by the European colonial powers. Since a modern manufacturing 
capability was virtually nonexistent, procurement of military 
equipment within the colonial territories was either impossible 
or limited to small arms and ammunition and non-lethal supplies 
such as uniforms Manpower alone was locally generated
The new countries, consequently, were in a state of 
military as well as economic underdevelopment at the dawn of 
independence. The revenue collection systems needed to raise the 
resources to finance the armed forces and other state operations 
either were not yet in existence or were unreliable. Few 
experienced officers were available —  colonial training, after 
all, had emphasized administrative skills and following orders 
over generalship and initiative. And, most importantly, there 
were no indigenous sources of military equipment.
The lack of a viable military infrastructure served to 
exacerbate the all too numerous security challenges confronting 
many of the newly independent countries. The artificiality of 
many third world countries generated both domestic and interna­
tional conflicts. All too often the new countries were a crazy 
patchwork quilt of diverse national, ethnic, tribal, and reli­
gious groups that were typically at odds with one another. The 
lack of fit between state and nation made internal conflict 
unescapable Groups previously united in a joint struggle to 
oust colonial rulers came to contend for state power and domi-
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nance. Contending ideological factions, which had subordinated 
their differences and collaborated in the overthrow of colonial 
rule, turned on one another in the attempt to seize control of 
the state apparatus Priorities were assigned not to building a 
viable state and society, but to the more primordial groups that, 
despite the conflicting claims of modernization, still laid claim 
to the loyalty traditionally expected of their members
The poor correspondence between state and "nation," or 
society, contributed to conflict among as well as within the new 
countries State boundaries established by the former colonial 
powers were often ill-defined and ill-conceived. Lands tradi­
tionally occupied by particular communal/ethnic communities 
were in many cases split between two or more sovereign countries, 
thereby leaving such communities without a clear national 
homeland. Not surprisingly, these torn and displaced communi­
ties became the source of international conflict. Territorial 
disputes reinforced by territorially divided communal groupings
have been a major cause of conflicts among developing coun- 
tries.
To counter these long-term internal and external threats, 
the newly established countries had only with poorly trained and 
equipped armed forces, forces that had been mere appendages of 
Europe's far-flung imperialist military establishments Even 
after the withdrawal of direct political and military control, 
the new countries remained militarily dependent —  initially upon 
their former colonizers and subsequently upon the two superpowers
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that have sought to build neo-colonial empires Their dependence 
was most dramatically evidenced by their continued reliance upon 
external sources of military equipment Confronted with external 
threats to their security and often even more threatening 
domestic conflict, possessing inadequately armed military forces, 
and lacking the industrial/technological base required to 
manufacture essential military equipment, developing countries 
had little alternative but to import massive amounts of foreign 
military hardware to equip their armed forces. Consequently, the 
third world's dependence upon arms imports from the advanced 
industrial countries, the former colonial powers, became the 
defining characteristic of post-colonial North-South military 
relations.
Single/Predominant Source Acquisition
It was during the immediate post-independence period that 
single/predominant source acquisition, the first of the two forms 
of the arms import option, was most in evidence Though there 
were exceptions (such as the Algerian-French nonrelationship), 
developing countries tended to acquire arms from their former 
colonizers during the immediate post-colonial period Having 
served with and been trained by core militaries, many third world 
militaries were quite reluctant to sever the close ties estab­
lished between the armed forces of the core and the periphery 
under colonialism Militaries accustomed to being commanded by a 
foreign military elite, and the equipment, training, and standard
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operating procedures of that elite, were typically inclined to 
turn to their former rulers for arms Thereby was the colonial 
military relationship perpetuated in the post-colonial world 
Former British colonies, for instance, imported military hardware 
from the United Kingdom, while the former French colonies turned 
to France In Africa, France remained the near exclusive 
supplier for former colonies such as the Central African Repub­
lic, Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, 
Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta, France was also Morocco's 
exclusive source of military supplies in the 1950s and remained 
a major source of armored vehicles through the 1960s, Kenya 
after independence acquired its arms primarily from Britain 
Britain was also the dominant supplier of Ghana and Nigeria, 
providing virtually all of the armored vehicles and naval vessels 
acquired by the two countries. And Britain was South Africa's 
primary supplier through the 1950s. In other areas, Britain was 
the dominant source of military equipment for Jordan, Kuwait, 
Oman, Brunei, Sri Lanka, and even India until the 1960s.^ During 
the late 1950s and the decade of the 1960s, of course, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, m  their Cold War scramble for 
post-colonial empires, displaced the former European colonial 
powers as the major arms suppliers to the developing world. 
Thereafter, one of the two superpowers tended to assume the role 
of single or predominant supplier
The arms transfer policies of the advanced industrial 
countries fostered the third world's dependence upon Northern
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arsenals Though commercial transfers have become increasingly 
important since the early 1970s, during the 1950s and 1960s 
developing countries were often able to acquire arms from what 
had become the two dominant suppliers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, through grant aid or other financially attractive 
means. American arms transfers to the third world during the 
1950s and 1960s were primarily in the form of grant aid And the 
Soviet Union provided arms on extremely generous termsf offering 
40 percent discounts, eight to ten year loans at the far below 
market interest rate of merely two and one-half percent, and 
accepting payment in soft currencies and even commodities.3
Even though US grant aid declined dramatically during the 
1970s and the Soviet Union has toughened the terms of its arms 
sales —  reducing the number and size of grants and often 
requiring payment in hard currencies* —  by having provided 
arms through grants or at bargain basement prices, the two 
leading suppliers had, purposely or not, discouraged the pursuit 
of alternative arms acquisition strategies Providing military 
equipment at low or no cost had reduced the incentive to initiate 
costly military import substitution programs The great cost 
disparity between importing arms and producing arms locally made 
it difficult to justify the more costly option, especially in the 
face of widespread economic difficulties Its low economic cost 
made military dependence appear relatively benign And once 
addicted to foreign arms, developing countries found it difficult 
to terminate their dependence upon Northern suppliers
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Most third world leaders, however, soon came to a full 
realization of the vulnerabilities and limitations inherent in 
dependence upon foreign arms suppliers, especially dependence 
upon a single or predominant external source of arms Singa­
pore's former foreign minister, S Rajaratnam, vividly portrayed 
the dangers of military dependence in an address before the 
General Assembly of the United Nations
• the most dangerous consequences are political.
The flow of arms carries with it a measure of 
dependency on the part of the client on the seller 
of arms not unlike that prevailing under the old 
imperial system.... The massive flow of arms to 
the third world confronts it with a new danger.
It is, first of all, a drain on the economies of 
third world countries; but even more important is 
the fact that it creates a new form of dependence 
on the great Powers, which can exploit the third 
world's dependence on them to manipulate them, to 
engineer conflicts between them, and to use them 
as proxies in their competition for influence and dominance.3
The greatest danger to the security and autonomy of third 
world counties posed by military dependence is the threat of arms 
embargoes. The flow of arms can be cut off at the whim of 
capricious suppliers Embargoes, especially during ongoing 
hostilities, severely restrict military autonomy and represent a 
direct threat to a country's security. The vulnerability of 
developing countries to arms embargoes has been demonstrated on a 
number of occasions. in September 1965, the U.S. and Britain 
both imposed embargoes following the outbreak of the Indo-Pakis- 
tani conflict of that year. Pakistan at the time was almost 
entirely dependent on American equipment and Britain was India's 
most important supplier During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, the
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ü S. again exercised its power to cut off supplies. Despite the 
U S. "tilt” toward Pakistan, Pakistan as well as India was 
subjected to an arms embargo. Export licenses for more than $3 
million worth of military equipment bound for Pakistan were 
cancelled and $11.3 million worth of military and other "sensi­
tive equipment” earmarked for India remained undelivered ® In 
1967, France terminated Israeli arms supplies following the Six 
Day War. France had been Israel's single most important source 
of arms prior to the war. The United Nations in 1963 imposed a 
voluntary arms embargo on South Africa and followed the volun­
tary embargo by the mandatory embargo of 1977. And in April 
1982, when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, the European 
Common Market voted to cut off the flow of arms to Argentina.
Militarily dependent developing countries have had to 
contend with interruptions in the flow of spare parts, upon which 
the continued operation of foreign equipment depends, as well as 
interruptions in the supply of complete weapons systems The 
British in 1973 refused to supply spare parts for Israel's 
Centurion tanks. Subsequent to Sadat's expulsion of Soviet 
advisers in 1972, the Soviet Union refused to provide needed 
spare parts for Egypt's Soviet weaponry, prompting Sadat to 
characterize much of his military equipment as "nothing but 
scrap "7 And the United States refused to supply Khomeini's Iran 
with spare parts for its American military equipment after the 
Iranian Revolution and the taking of the American embassy 
hostages
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Foreign arms purchases bring not only arms but also the 
foreign technicians and advisers required to train local mili­
taries in the maintenance, repair, and operation of sophisticated 
military systems, thereby in3 ecting an irksome and sometimes 
insidious external presence into the core of the national 
security apparatus. Singapore's Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Robin Luckham have both pointed out the dilemmas inherent in 
introducing foreign weapons and the following train of advisers 
and technicians. According to Foreign Minister Rajaratnaro,
The weapons now being imported are not only highly 
sophisticated but also packaged as parts of a very 
complex, very comprehensive and very expensive 
weapons system. When a country buys a weapon sys­
tem it imports not only weapons but a whole array 
of experts and advisers. Arms contracts today in­
clude provisions for training, technical support 
and the establishment of facilities to maintain 
and repair equipment. Often these contracts in­
clude provisions for foreign experts to build 
roads, communication networks and other facilities 
which come under the term 'infrastructure.'8
Luckham's analysis echoes Ra3aratnam's evaluation
The implications of military training and assistance 
programs for external dependence are easy to see 
They train soldiers in the use of the technologies 
of the donor countries. They give sustenance to the 
social relations of force around which the profes­
sional armies of both metropolis and periphery are 
organised. They create networks of professional 
contacts both with the metropolitan military insti­
tutions and among course-mates m  different peri­
pheral countries. And they are often explicitly 
intended.. to promote the political philosophy 
and interests of the country which provides the 
training 9
The United States and the Soviet Union have been quite 
adept at following up their arms deliveries to third world 
countries with an infusion of logistical support and training
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teams. In 1975, for instance, the United States had 9,535 people 
serving in 132 technical assistance and training teams in 34 
countries, with the largest contingencies in South Vietnam, Saudi 
Arabia, and Iran.10 Almost 40,000 Americans were involved in 
military activities in Iran before the Shah was ousted.11 In 
Saudi Arabia, the U S. Army Corps of Engineers has been kept busy 
since 1953 supervising the construction of a military infrastruc­
ture consisting of airfields, ports, and communications systems, 
and training Saudi military personnel.12 During the period 
FY1950-FY1985, 33,396 military personnel from the Near East and 
South Asia, 268,101 from East Asia and the Pacific (excluding 
Japan), 9,562 from Africa, and 99,296 from Latin America were 
trained under the U.S. military assistance program.13
The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, according to a 
CIA report, had 15,865 military technicians stationed in the 
third world in 1979 —  6,825 in Africa, 110 in Latin America, 
4,780 in the Middle East, and 4,150 in South Asia.1* The largest 
concentrations of Warsaw Pact military technicians were in 
Algeria (1,015), Libya (1,820), Angola (1,400), Ethiopia (1,250), 
Iraq (1,065), South Yemen (1,100), Syria (2,480), and Afghanistan 
(4,000) 15 During the period 1955-1979, the Soviet Union trained 
a total of 45,585 third world military personnel —  14,420 from 
Africa, 7,590 from East Asia, 780 from Latin America, 16,370 from 
the Middle East, and 6,425 from South Asia 1®
These data indicate the nature of the continuing military 
relationship that can accompany arms imports The military
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assistance (i.e , training) programs that follow in the wake of 
arms imports can provide suppliers with a direct military 
presence on the terrritory of recipients and tend to reinforce 
military dependence by institutionalizing corporate and personal 
ties between the armed forces of the core and periphery. This 
military assistance relationship is, like the central relation­
ship itself —  the arms supply relationship —  an instrument that 
can be wielded by the supplier to exert influence upon the 
domestic and foreign policies of recipients.
In addition to suspending deliveries of weapons and spare 
parts and complementing arms transfers with military assistance
programs, arms suppliers have typically imposed restrictions on
(
the end-use of military equipment The United States, for 
instance, has traditionally provided military equipment on the 
condition that it be used solely for defensive purposes 
Consequently, Turkey1 s use of American arms in the 1974 invasion 
of Cyprus resulted in the cancellation of U S. military aid 
and assistance in 1975. And before Portugal had divested itself 
of its last African colonial holdings, both West Germany and 
Italy had prohibited Portuguese use of their arms in Africa.1^
Suppliers have also imposed restrictions on the resale of 
military equipment. Prior approval of retransfers, on a case-by­
case basis, has long been a part of 0 S. arms transfer policy 
When Saudi Arabia expressed interest in acquiring U S F-14s from 
Iran after the overthrow of the Shah and the seizure of the 
American embassy in Teheran, the U S halted the deal.18 Even
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the sale of foreign military equipment containing American
components is subject to U S. approval, as Israel discovered when
it first attempted to sell its American-engined Kfir fighter to
Ecuador and Taiwan In order to avoid unknowing participation in
triangular deals, France, West Germany, and Switzerland have also
forbidden retransfers without their formal consent,19
Developing countries that are dependent upon arms imports
must also contend with the attempts of suppliers to use the
supply relationship to exert influence on their foreign and
domestic policies. The prospect of acquiring leverage over
recipients is one of the major forces driving Northern arms
transfers in the first place. Northern suppliers have long used
arms transfers as a means of gaining access to foreign political
and military leaders, shoring up alliance commitments, and
instituting friendlier relations, all in the hope of obtaining
influence, whether it be explicit or implicit. Barry Blechman
and his former ACDA colleagues correctly noted that
The recipient's dependency on the donor for 
maintenance, spare parts, and replacement of 
major items of military equipment is seen to 
provide leverage in difficult situations. The 
arms donor need not actually threaten to cur­
tail supplies because the two superpowers know 
that this dependency will influence recipient's 
decisions long before the donor would need to 
contemplate such threats 20
Arms transfers have played a central role in the post-world 
War II U S -Soviet competition for influence m  the third world 
Both superpowers have provided military hardware with the 
expectation, and often the explicit requirement, that recipients
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would align themselves politically and militarily with the 
supplying country and would adopt policies that furthered the 
interests of their supplier The United States, for instance, 
has seldom hesitated to draw upon the influence derived from its 
security relationship with the Philippines. Philippine leaders, 
both civilian and military, have relied heavily on the advice of 
the Joint U S Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) In 1950, JUSMAG 
reorganized the Philippine intelligence apparatus and the 
military campaign against the Huk insurgency, and managed to 
assure the selection of Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National 
Defense.2 -^ In 1953, American officials in the Philippines 
engineered Magsaysay's election to the presidency.22 And the 
Philippines loyally supported the U.S during both the Korean and 
the Vietnam wars, going so far as to contribute a combat bat­
talion to the cause in Korea and a civic action unit in Viet­
nam 2 3
American attempts to exploit its security relationships with 
third world countries are not, of course, limited to the Philipp­
ines. The U S. has often manipulated the flow of arms to the
Middle East in its efforts to prevent peace negotiations from/
collapsing. Israel was provided with F-15s and other weapons in 
return for its approval of the 1975 Sinai accords, and F-5s were 
sold to Egypt in 1978 to keep Sadat from breaking off talks with 
Israel.24 The United States has on occasion terminated the flow 
of arms to countries judged to be violators of basic human 
rights In 1974 the U S Congress adopted legislation ter-
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minating arms sales and military assistance to Chile in an effort 
to curtail the severe repression being perpetrated by the 
military junta that had overthrown Salvadore Allende. Concern 
for human rights played an even more central role in the Carter 
administration's arms sales policy. During its first year in 
office, the Carter administration reduced the flow of arms to 
countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Ethiopia, all of which 
had been cited as human rights violators in the administration's 
first report on report on the subject. Latin American countries 
appear to have been special targets of Carter’s effort to utilize 
the leverage thought to be derived from the military supply 
relationship in the administration's crusade to safeguard human 
rights and eliminate state violence and repression.25
Multiple Source Acquisition
Not surprisingly, developing countries have sought to 
counter the constraints inherent in dependence upon a single or 
primary source of arms The first of two counter-dependence 
strategies, and typically the first to be adopted, is to import 
arms from multiple sources. This first counter-dependence 
strategy is a short-run, relatively low-cost option, and has as 
its objective the distribution of dependence across a large 
number of suppliers so that no one supplier could seriously limit 
recipient political and military autonomy. The multiplication of 
suppliers has as its primary goal not so much the elimination of 
military dependence as the reduction of the relative significance
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of any particular supplier The aim is to reduce not the fact 
but the impact of arms import dependence by spreading it around 
and distributing it across a larger number of suppliers It is 
assumed, not unreasonably, that a large number of suppliers will 
find it much more difficult to manipulate and exploit a country’s 
dependence upon imported arms than would only one or two sup­
pliers
Numerous developing countries have turned to multiple source 
acquisition Nigeria, after gaining its independence from 
Britain in 1960, quickly turned to a variety of sources for its 
military equipment Although most its naval vessels have been 
obtained from Britain, Nigeria has acquired its other military 
equipment from a large number of countries Aircraft have been 
obtained from Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Italy, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, West Germany, and the 
United States Exocet ship-to-ship missiles have been acquired 
from France, Aspide, Albatros, and OTOMAT missiles from Italy, 
and Seacat missiles from Britain* Though most of the armored 
vehicles acquired during the 1960s came from Britain, Nigeria 
also acquired Panhard AML-60/90 armored cars from France in the 
late 1960s and T-55 m a m  battle tanks from the Soviet Union in 
the late 1970s 26
While Nigeria imported arms from a large number of countries 
soon after independence, most developing countries maintained 
close military ties to one of the four manor suppliers —  the 
United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain —  and
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turned to multiple source acquisition only in the 1970s. Egypt, 
for instance, though it initially relied on Britain for its 
military hardware, in the mid- to late-1950s turned to the Soviet 
Union. Since disassociating itself from the Soviet Union in 
1972, when it ordered the withdrawal of 21,000 Soviet military 
technicians form its territory,27 Egypt has acquired arms not 
only from the United States, its new patron, but from Britain, 
France, Italy, and the PRC. And Peru, which was dependent upon 
American arms supplies during the 1950s and 1960s, turned to 
Australia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and 
West Germany in the 1970s.
The trend is clearly in the direction of multiple source 
acquisition for those countries that still rely on imported 
weaponry. In Africa, for instance, where few countries are able 
to produce a significant proportion of their arms, 25 countries 
were dependent upon a sole or predominant supplier during the 
years 1961-1971 Only nine (26 percent) had turned to multiple 
source acquisition during this period. During the years 1967- 
1976, however, 17 countries (41 percent) turned to multiple 
suppliers (though 24 still relied upon a sole or predominant 
supplier) Sixteen of 37 (or 43 percent) sub-Saharan African 
countries during the years 1974-1978 acquired arms from multiple 
sources Twenty-one still depended upon a sole or predominant 
supplier.2®
Yet despite the increasing popularity of multiple source 
acquisition, there are ma3or drawbacks to reliance on multiple
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suppliers as a counter-dependence strategy Apart from the fact 
that dependence on imported military equipment is not actually 
reduced but merely made to appear somewhat benign, multiple 
source acquisition often results in a polyglot assemblage of 
military equipment that poses significant training and mainte­
nance problems Technicians and operators must learn to main­
tain, repair, and operate not only the aircraft, armored ve­
hicles, missiles, and naval vessels of one foreign country, but 
of a large number of countries. The operational and technical 
capacity of third world military establishments can be strained 
to the limit. Egypt, for instance, with its vast, heterogenous 
array of American, Chinese, French, and Soviet aircraft, must 
cope with an extremely complicated logistical system.^ Multiple 
source acquisition clearly means that the traditional goal of 
military standardization must be discarded
Even though multiple source acquisition provides a degree 
of insulation from the effects of military dependence, any one 
supplier might still possess the ability to hinder military 
operations by withholding spare parts or withdrawing support and 
maintenance units for vital equipment, such as aircraft, that 
requires frequent or near-continuous service. The operation of 
essential systems could be seriously curtailed, or even ter­
minated, by such tactics. Multiple source acquisition, there­
fore, is not a viable long-term counter-dependence strategy.
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Military Import Substitution (MIS)
The innate inability of multiple source acquisition to 
insure military and political autonomy has prompted developing 
countries to turn to a second counter-dependence strategy 
military import substitution Substituting indigenously produced 
for imported weapons offers the prospect, albeit long-term, of 
achieving a high degree of military self-reliance By acquiring 
the capability to manufacture domestically a large proportion of 
the military equipment it requires, a developing country can 
begin to reduce, and in the long-term perhaps eliminate alto­
gether, the vulnerabilities inherent in dependence upon arms 
imports, whether from single or multiple sources. Domestic 
production removes the constraints imposed by import dependence. 
When military equipment is acquired at home rather than from 
abroad, military planning and operations are no longer hampered 
by the possibility of arms embargoes, the withholding of spare 
parts, supplier efforts to use the supply relationship as 
leverage to exert influence, and the other circumscriptions of 
military dependence.
Military import substitution is a process that takes on 
different forms as it evolves through five distinct stages. The 
first stage involves simply the assembly of imported arms. 
Weaponry is still acquired from foreign suppliers, but is 
imported in the form of prefabricated components and assembled 
in-country The foreign supplier provides technical training and 
assists in erecting the facilities necessary for weapons assem-
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»bly. Technical training includes not only assembly skills, but 
also the use of equipment needed to inspect, evaluate, and test 
the weapons being assembled In the second stage, components are 
produced under license agreements with foreign suppliers. The 
complete weapon itself is still only assembled, but an increasing 
number of components are fabricated locally It is in the third 
stage that MIS results in the actual production of complete 
weapons -- foreign military equipment is manufactured under 
license. In the fourth stage, developing countries engaged in 
MIS utilize the technological skills and capabilities acquired in 
earlier stages to modify/redesign or reproduce (through reverse 
engineering) foreign weapons systems. This is the first stage in 
which some element of indigenous research and development appears 
—  in the form of either system redesign or reverse engineering. 
In the fifth stage MIS finally results in the production of 
indigenously designed arms. Fifth stage production can take two 
forms (1) production based on local research and development 
but still incorporating foreign-produced or designed components; 
or (2) production based entirely on indigenous, independent 
research and development,^
Large-scale military import substitution in the third world 
is a relatively recent phenomenon. Only four developing coun­
tries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and India) were producing any 
of the four types of ma}or conventional weapons —  aircraft, 
armored vehicles, missiles, and naval vessels —  m  1950 By 
1980, however, 26 developing countries were producing one or more
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»of the major weapons systems,32 Of these 26 countries, fifteen 
were producing aircraft, six were manufacturing armored vehicles, 
nine were producing missiles, and twenty-four were building naval 
vessels Six countries —  Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, 
South Korea, and South Africa —  were producing each of the four 
types of weapons A total of eighteen developing countries had 
demonstrated, by 1980, the ability to manufacture either air­
craft, armored vehicles, missiles, or naval vessels that were the 
products of domestic research and development programs. The 
tremendous increases in the number of third world arms producers, 
the range of weapons produced, and the level of indigenous input 
are all the result of defense manufacturing and research and 
development programs initiated during the late-1960s and the 
decade of the 1970s.33
That an increasing number of third world countries have 
turned to domestic arms acquisition in an attempt to wean 
themselves from their dependence upon external suppliers is 
beyond dispute The success of military import substitution 
programs in actually reducing the level of external depen­
dence and promoting military self-reliance and political-military 
autonomy has, however, triggered an as yet unresolved debate.
The growth of military manufacturing activities in the 
developing world has relied heavily upon imported military 
technology —  technology acquired from the saune sources that 
third world countries have traditionally been dependent upon for 
imported arms The third world's defense industries were
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*constructed upon a base of imported Northern military technology 
and many of its products continue to incorporate imported 
technology in the form of either foreign components or compo­
nents manufactured locally under licensing arrangements with 
Northern suppliers. Consequently, dispensers of the conventional 
wisdom argue that little has changed with the expansion of the 
third world's defense production capabilities According to this 
line of argument, military import substitution has not led to the 
reduction, much less elimination, of dependence upon imported 
arms The declared goal of military self-reliance has not been, 
and will not be, attained. Instead, there has merely been a 
change in the form of dependence as countries have substituted 
locally produced for imported military equipment.
A number of observers are adherents of what has been 
identified here as the conventional wisdom Anne Cahn and her 
coauthors have asserted that "Instead of creating independence, 
indigenous production usually creates a new set of dependen­
cies."34 Stephanie Neuman has claimed that ". . self-sufficiency 
in weapons production is beyond the reach of less developed 
countries. Domestic production creates other dependencies."35 
According to the highly regarded International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, ".. the dependence normally associated with 
arms transfers does not disappear with the establishment of 
domestic defense industries "35 Another analyst, Michael 
Moodie, has argued that
Third World dependence associated with arms
imports from industrial countries does not dis-
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*appear .. with the creation of local defense in­
dustries; the form of the dependence is changed 3 '
The nature of dependence is transformed from one 
of reliance on industrial producers for arms to 
dependence on them for inputs to make arms
... Third World arms producers have traded one form 
of dependence for another They have shifted the 
nature of their requirements from the need for 
finished weapons systems to the need for the tech­
nologies to manufacture those systems 39
Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf have gone so far as to argue that
The import of sophisticated capital-intensive 
technology and especially the establishment of com­
plex arms production programmes increases the de- 
pendence^gn suppliers from industrialised coun- 
t r i es.•
And Wulf has concluded that
... for the time being there is no short-term or 
even medium-term fulfillment of the desire of 
developing countries to reach a high degree of 
self-sufficiency in arms production.41
According to this received wisdom, therefore, as developing
countries substitute locally manufactured weapons for imported
weapons, technological dependence is simply being substituted for
import dependence. Instead of achieving the proclaimed goal of
military self-reliance, third world defense producers are merely
exchanging dependence upon imported arms for dependence upon
imported military technology
As I have argued elsewhere, however, it may well be that as 
military import substitution programs develop and mature, far 
more takes place than a mere change in the form of military 
dependence 4  ^ The nature of military dependence undergoes a 
subtle but potentially profound transformation as developing
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Vcountries turn from arms imports to arms production. Instead of 
importing only a finished product, developing countries have 
begun to import and assimilate the technological capability 
necessary to manufacture, and eventually develop, weapons 
domestically. The third world's defense manufacturers have 
consequently been acquiring the means to alter the traditional 
North-South dependency relationship
A static dependency relationship is inevitable when a 
country relies upon foreign arms suppliers. But when arms 
production programs are initiated, and military production 
technology rather than arms are imported, a more dynamic rela­
tionship is established, one that has an inherent potential for 
the reduction, if not elimination, of military dependence. 
Promulgators of the conventional wisdom have failed to recognize 
the crucial difference between dependence on arms imports and 
dependence on technology imports the former engenders a static 
dependency relationship while the latter results in a dynamic 
relationship. The import of military technology has enabled 
a growing number of developing countries to build arms industries 
that may eventually provide the bulk of required military 
hardware, thereby greatly reducing the need for foreign hard­
ware As experience accumulates in the development and produc­
tion of weapons, the world's newest defense manufacturers will 
also become increasingly less dependent upon foreign military 
technology J. Fred Buey, of Texas Instruments, was right on the 
mark when he wrote m  a 1976 Defense Science Report that "The
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release of technology is an irreversible decision Once re­
leased, it can neither be taken back nor controlled The
receiver of know-now g a m s  a competence which serves as a base 
for many subsequent gains."43
Dependence on foreign military technology can be overcome in 
the long-term just as technological dependence in other industri­
al sectors can be superseded 44 The transfer of military 
technology from the advanced industrial countries of the North to 
the developing countries of the South has set in motion a process 
that may well eventuate in a dramatic reduction of the developing 
world's military dependence on tÄe North. As Steven Spiegel has 
written on the subject of North-South military technology 
transfers:
This kind of assistance has the greatest effect 
of any kind of military aid on a consumer's 
power in the long run, both in terms of military 
capability and in terms of economic spin-off on 
domestic industries and the ability to produce 
arms for export The political implications of 
helping a nation to produce its own arms are also 
far reaching. Once a country has gained this 
capacity, an increased level of political inde­
pendence and increased freedom to pursue its own 
foreign policy goals is implied 43
The manner in which third world arms manufacturers have gone 
about MIS has insured the national autonomy of their defense 
industries Even though foreign defense technology has played a 
major role in building up the third world's defense industries, 
foreign defense firms have not The emergence and growth of 
defense production in the third world is not the result of 
Northern defense manufacturers shifting production operations
25
to the South Whether defense production is concentrated in the 
public sector, as in India, the private sector, as in South 
Korea, or is spread across both sectors, as in Brazil, foreign 
defense firms have not been permitted to invest heavily in third 
world arms industries. Foreign direct investment in the defense 
sector has been strictly limited Brazil, for instance, has 
sought to assure national control by restricting FDI in any given 
defense firm to 49 percent Unlike many other industrial sectors 
in developing countries, therefore, the defense sector is not a 
penetrated sector.
This challenge to the conventional wisdom is more than a 
mere argument based solely on logic There is an empirical as 
well as an analytical basis for the challenge. The most advanced 
of the third world's defense producers, producers such as Brazil, 
India, Israel, South Africa, and South Korea, have already been 
able to reduce the degree of their dependence upon both foreign 
arms and foreign technology. Brazil, in particular, has made 
tremendous strides. In 1970, just a year after Embraer, Brazil's 
premier aircraft manufacturer, had been founded by the state, 
only about 40 percent of the Brazilian Air Force's fleet was of 
local origin.4** The situation was quite different by the 
mid-1980s. In 1984, approximately 77 percent of the Brazilian 
Air Force's total inventory of 740 planes and helicopters were of 
local origin. The tactical, maritime, transport, and training 
commands were all dominated by Brazilian-built aircraft 
Furthermore, all 280 aircraft on order in 1984 were to be
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47 And, most importantly, theprocured from Brazilian firms 
Bandeirante transport/raaritime patrol aircraft, the Xingu 
transport/trainer, the Brasilia transport/reconnaissance air­
craft, and the internationally acclaimed Tucano trainer being 
acquired from Embraer are all not only built but designed by 
Embraer.*® Embraer*s aviation design expertise received interna­
tional recognition in 1980 when Embraer entered into a partner­
ship with two Italian aerospace firms, Aeritalia and Aeronautica 
Macchi, to develop the AMX, a fighter/bomber and ground attack 
aircraft scheduled for introduction in late 1987/early 1988.49
Brazil's programs to substitute domestically produced for 
imported armored vehicles, missiles, and naval vessels are also 
at an advanced stage. The army has been acquiring Engesa's 
Cascavel and Urutu wheeled armored vehicles since the early 
1970s and will soon have Engesa's Osorio main battle tank. 
Avibras Aerospacial has been providing the military with Piranna 
air-to-air missiles, Careara air-to-surface missiles, 70mm 
air-to-surface rockets, 127mm surface-to-surface rockets, and the 
Astros II 16-tube rocket system Although somewhat less progress 
has been made in nationalizing the procurement of naval vessels, 
the navy has been able to acquire locally built and designed 
patrol craft and corvettes These armored vehicles, missiles, 
rockets, and naval vessels, like Embraer's aircraft, were all 
designed by Brazilian firms ^0
As a result of the success of its military import substitu­
tion programs, Brazil during the first half of the 1980s no
longer had to import light military aircraft such as trainers, 
transports, and COIN aircraft, armored cars, armored personnel 
carriers, wheeled armored fighting vehicles, light tanks, rockets 
and missiles, small naval vessels, or small arms and ammuni­
tion 51 The success of its nationalization effort is indicated 
by the fact that Brazil's arms imports fell from a high of $304 
million in 1979 to only $38 million by 1983 At the same time 
Brazil's arms exports rose from $49 million in 1975 to a high of 
$300 million in 1982 52
Although few other developing countries have been as 
dramatically successful as Brazil in their attempts to nationa­
lize arms procurement, countries such as South Africa, Israel, 
India, and South Korea have experienced varying degrees of 
success in their efforts to reduce dependence upon imported 
arms. South Africa has become virtually self-sufficient and arms 
are no longer imported in significant quantities 53 Israel has 
invested heavily in a technologically sophisticated and interna­
tionally competitive defense industry that provides for an ever 
increasing proportion of the country's needs.54
Military self-reliance has been a ma}or preoccupation of 
India's political leaders since the country gained its indepen­
dence in 1947. The fact that some sixty-three percent of the 
Indian Air Force's inventory of over 1500 aircraft in 1984 had 
been built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, India's state-owned 
aircraft manufacturer, is indicative of the success, even though 
limited, of India's military import substitution programs 55 And
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although India has acquired several hundred Soviet T-54 and T-55 
tanks, the domestically produced Vijayanta comprised sixty-five 
percent of the Army's tank force in 1984 56 In addition, India 
was in the process of acquiring domestically built destroyers, 
frigates, corvettes, jet fighters, and helicopters in the 
mid-1980s 57 India's defense industry, unlike Brazil's, however, 
has relied heavily on licensed production of foreign equipment, 
such as Soviet MiG-23s, which comprise the core of the air 
force's fighting force.58
Despite its special relationship with the United States and 
its reliance upon American weaponry and the presence of U.S. 
troops, South Korea too has had success in nationalizing its arms 
procurement South Korea, like Brazil, invested heavily in a 
defense industrial complex during the 1970s. As a result, 
according to a U.S. Congressional Budget Office Study, 50 percent 
of all required military equipment was being produced in-country 
by 1978 59 By the early 1980s, 70 percent of the weaponry needed 
by the Korean armed forces was being manufactured locally 58 
Again like Brazil, South Korea's arms imports have been declining 
and its arms exports rising Arms imports fell from $722 million 
m  1978 to $278 million in 1983 while arms exports rose from a 
mere $8 million in 1975 to $950 million in 1982 61
Due to the rapid economic growth of the 1970s, South Korea 
has also assumed the financial burden of its own defense 
In fiscal year 1966 the U S provided the funds for 85 percent of 
Korean defense expenditures By FY 1976 the U S was providing
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Vonly 12 percent of the country's military expenditures —  and 
two-thirds of the funds provided by the ü S, in FY 1976 were in 
the form of Foreign Military Sales credits that would be re­
paid 62 By FY 1977 South Korea was " .. funding essentially 
all of its defense costs..."63 Even though American troops 
remain in South Korea (though in declining numbers since the late 
1960s), South Korea has clearly demonstrated its ability to 
reduce its dependence upon the United States.
Despite the success of countries such as Brazil, South 
Africa, Israel, India, and South Korea, not all of the third 
world countries that have turned to military import substitution 
have eliminated, or even will eliminate, the^need for imported 
weapons and become self-sufficient. The need for external 
inputs remains. Argentina, for instance, even though it has long 
had an across-the-board production capability, still employed 
imported weapons against the British in its attempt to wrest 
the Malvinas from Britain in 1982 64 Egypt, with its more 
recently acquired across-the-board production capability, still 
relies heavily on arms supplied by the United States and various 
West European suppliers Other, less capable, producers, such as 
Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philip­
pines, Taiwan, or Thailand, are even further from the goal of 
military self-reliance And even the most advanced producers 
have not yet completely eliminated the need for imported weap­
ons Israel still requires American supplies The most techno­
logically sophisticated weapons in the Indian arsenal are
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1still imported. And even though South Korea produces some 70 
percent of the military equipment its armed forces have acquired 
in recent years, it still purchases American weapons and U S. 
troops have not yet departed.
Those third world arms manufacturers that exist in a 
high-threat, technologically sophisticated military environment 
have found it extremely difficult to throw off the shackles of 
military dependence —  even when, as in the cases of Israel, 
India, and South Korea, the resources devoted to military import 
substitution programs have been far from insubstantial. While 
Brazil, situated in a relatively benign security environment, 
greatly reduced the level of its dependence upon imported arms in 
a short period of time, and South Africa, confronted only by 
militarily weak adversaries, has become essentially self-reliant, 
Israel, India, and South Korea have found the process of reducing 
military dependence to be somewhat more arduous, Israel is 
located in what is arguably the most volatile region of the world 
and is confronted with adversaries that have been able to acquire 
some of the most advanced conventional weaponry available. The 
threat to Israel's security is immediate, constant, and non­
receding, India is confronted by two troublesome adversaries. 
One, China, has the world's largest military establishment. The 
other, Pakistan, has been armed with advanced American weaponry. 
And South Korea is confronted by an implacable foe a North 
Korea that maintains a military establishment that is larger than 
South Korea's and that is supplied and supported by two ma3 or
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\powers —  the Soviet Onion and China
While Israel, India, and South Korea have been able to 
reduce the level of their dependence upon imported arms, it is 
inherently more difficult for them to become militarily self- 
reliant in the same sense that Brazil and South Africa have 
become self-reliant Both South Africa and Brazil were able to 
utilize middle-level military technology in their quest for 
self-sufficiency Given the nature of the threats they confront, 
however, Israel, India, and South Korea are compelled to acquire 
weaponry at the cutting edge of technology. In other words, the 
products of these three countries must be able to compete 
directly with those of the major arms suppliers —  the two 
superpowers and the countries of Western Europe
Yet despite the numerous obstacles confronted by countries 
attempting to nationalize arms procurement and reduce the level 
of their dependence on arms imports, the manner in which third 
world defense producers acquire arms increasingly resembles the 
manner in which many of the advanced industrial countries procure 
military equipment. Thirty percent, for instance, of the defense 
contracts entered into by Italy in 1980 were for foreign military 
equipment Over one-third of the military equipment purchased by 
Sweden during the 1970s was imported.65 Britain, West Germany, 
Italy, and other West European members of NATO, like third world 
arms producers, continue to import some of the arms their 
military forces require Many advanced industrial countries, 
again like third world arms producers, also manufacture military
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equipment under license Britain, for instance, produces French 
Milan anti-tank missiles and American AIM-9 surface-to-air 
missiles, TOW anti-tank missiles, and Harpoon submarine-to-ship 
missiles, while Italy builds French Roland-2 surface-to-air 
missiles, Milan anti-tank missiles and a whole array of American 
missiles, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers 66 
The sources of military equipment for the third world's arms 
producers and the advanced industrial countries, therefore, are 
not terribly dissimilar.
Local Production/Import Acquisition (LP/IA)
As has become evident, those third world countries that have 
attempted to nationalize arms procurement have, in effect, 
adopted a "mixed" local production/import acquisition posture. 
The inability of even the most advanced third world defense 
manufacturers to produce 100 percent of the equipment their 
military establishments desire compel them to continue acquiring 
some of their requirements from foreign suppliers. Third world 
arms producers, therefore, like the Northern advanced indus­
trial countries, manufacture what they can and import the rest. 
No third world military establishment relies exclusively on the 
products of local industry The pure form of domestic production 
does not yet exist in the third world (nor, of course, does it 
exist in the North —  even the United States and the Soviet Union 
import arms)
The 51 developing countries that had, by the mid-1980s,
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1initiated MIS programs, whether limited to the production of 
small arms and ammunition or committed to the development of an 
across-the-board production capability, had, de facto, adopted a 
local production/import acquisition strategy A LP/IA posture 
can take a number of forms, ranging from limited production 
capabilities and extensive arms imports at one end of the 
continuum to extensive production capabilities and limited arms 
imports at the other end Arms imports may be from a single/pre- 
dominant source or multiple sources —  although countries that 
have made the effort to reduce military dependency by initiating 
MIS programs are more likely to import arms from multiple sources 
than from a single/predominant source.
All things being equal, a country’s political and military 
autonomy is to a large degree a function of where they are 
located on the LP/IA continuum Countries such as the Philip­
pines and Pakistan that have only limited production capabilities 
and a high import-to-production ratio are vulnerable and may well 
experience serious constraints on their political-military 
autonomy, especially if they depend on a single or predominant 
external supplier. Countries such as Brazil and South Africa 
that have built up extensive indigenous production capabilities 
and have a low import-to-production ratio will find that while 
they may be somewhat sensitive to disruptions in the supply of 
foreign arms, they are no longer vulnerable and they in fact 
possess considerable policy and behavioral autonomy Although a 
handful of developing countries, including Brazil, South Africa,
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Israel, and South Korea, will be arrayed toward what they would 
certainly view as the positive end of the continuum (extensive 
production capabilities and a relatively low import-to-production 
ratio), the distribution of countries along the LP/IA continuum, 
given the limited capabilities of the majority of the third 
world's defense producers, is skewed toward the "negative" end of 
the continuum (limited production capabilities and a relatively 
high import-to-production ratio)
Of course, all things are not equal. As noted earlier, a 
high threat, sophisticated military environment complicates 
counter-dependence efforts. The level of indigenous content of 
locally manufactured equipment must also be taken into account 
The further a country has advanced through the five stages of 
production, and the greater, therefore, the level of local input, 
the more likely it is that import dependence will have been 
reduced and autonomy enhanced It is, however, quite possible 
for a country to have developed an across-the-board production 
capability but still be located closer to the negative end of the 
LP/IA continuum than expected —  either because production is 
stalled at stage three with no local research and design input 
(Egypt), or the security problems confronting a country are of 
such magnitude that even though stage four and/or five production 
of aircraft, armored vehicles, missiles, and naval vessels is 
taking place, military supplies must still be acquired from 
abroad, especially during crises (Israel)
A major determinant of the level of local content (or value
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added) is a country's technological and industrial capabilities 
Only when industrialization has spawned a corps of skilled 
workers, an industrial managerial elite, trained scientific and 
technical manpower, and when other industrial sectors, such as, 
for instance, the steel, chemical, electronics, and transporta­
tion sectors, are able to support the development of a local 
content-intensive defense industry is there any prospect for 
military self-reliance and policy and behavioral autonomy Third 
world countries, such as Brazil and Israel, with relatively 
technologically advanced, diversified industrial economies have 
been more successful not only in building a defense industrial 
sector, and thereby reducing the range of weapons that must be 
imported, but also in turning out defense products that have a 
high degree of local content than less technologically and 
industrially capable countries such as Pakistan
CONCLUSION
The countries of the third world have available to them the 
same set of arms acquisition options available to the advanced 
industrial countries Of the thre^ e possible acquisition strate­
gies, the arms import option, whether m  the form of single/ 
predominant source acquisition or multiple source acquisition, 
has proven to be the most problematic Single/predommant source 
external acquisition results in military dependency and the loss 
of policy and behavioral autonomy Multiple source external 
acquisition, even though it has been adopted as a counterdepen-
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dence strategy, only enables an importer to spread its dependency 
across several suppliers. It does not reduce the level of 
dependency and serves to complicate training, maintenance, and 
logistical requirements
)
Military import substitution, the second counterdependence 
strategy, has enabled third world arms producers to reduce their 
dependence on arms imports by substituting locally designed and 
manufactured weaponry for imported weaponry By diminishing 
dependence on external suppliers, a successful MIS strategy 
fosters policy and behavioral autonomy Yet despite the poten­
tial counterdependence, autonomy enhancing impact of MIS, those 
third world countries that have initiated arms production 
efforts, even those with relatively mature, large-scale programs, 
must still, to a greater or lesser degree, depending on their 
technological and industrial capabilities, the magnitude of the 
threat confronting them, and the technological sophistication of 
their security environment, import arms
Since even the most advanced of the third world's arms 
manufacturers have not yet proven capable of relying solely on 
local production to meet the requirements of their military 
establishments, available arms acquisition options have been 
reduced, in effect, from three to two Two analytically distinct 
options, the military import substitution option and the mixed, 
local production/import acquisition option, have been merged in 
practice Those countries that produce arms also import varying 
quantities of arms In the final analysis therefore, the choice
37
for third world countries (and the advanced industrial countries 
as well) boils down to either (1) acquisition from abroad —  
whether of the single/predommant source or multiple source 
variety, or (2) local production/iraport acquisition The latter 
option, even though it can not assure absolute autonomy, has 
proven to be more conducive to policy and behavioral autonomy 
than the former
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